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Doublethink
“War Is Peace” and “Freedom Is Slavery”
1984, by George Orwell
Academic freedom is furthered by allowing law schools to deny students
the freedom to hear military recruiters’ viewpoint.
Third Circuit Court of Appeals in Fair v. Rumsfeld
INTRODUCTION
The Solomon Amendment, 10 U.S.C. § 1983, requires the Secretary
of Defense to withhold federal funds from any institution of higher
learning which denies military recruiters access to the institution’s
campus equal to the access afforded other employers. This statute has
created a conflict between law schools and the military. Virtually all law
schools have adopted a non-discrimination policy, mandated by the
American Association of Law Schools (“AALS”), which prohibits any
discrimination based on sexual orientation. The military, however,
applies, as required by statute, the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy, which
precludes any non-closeted homosexual from military employment.
Law schools sought federal court intervention to declare the
Solomon Amendment unconstitutional. Their claim was that the
Department of Defense violated the law schools’ free speech and free
association constitutional rights by conditioning their receipt of federal
funds on the requirement to associate with, and endorse, the military’s
discriminatory employment policies—an endorsement they assert will
flow from allowing the military to recruit under the law schools’
auspices.
After the law schools’ application for a preliminary injunction
against enforcement of the Solomon Amendment was denied in the
district court, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, in Forum for Academic
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and Institutional Rights (“FAIR”) v. Rumsfeld, by a 2-1 split, in June
2004, reversed and granted the preliminary injunction.1 The United
States Supreme Court has granted the government’s application for
certiorari,2 and will soon hear that appeal.3
PURPOSE OF THIS ARTICLE
This article does not evaluate the merits or shortcomings of the
military’s “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy. Like it or not—there are able
proponents and opponents of the policy—it is a policy enacted into
statute by Congress and signed into law by President Clinton. And it has
been upheld by each of the several courts that have been asked to declare
it unconstitutional. The proper venue for questioning the advisability of
the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy thus is in Congress, not the courts. It
is apparently in recognition of that reality that the plaintiffs in FAIR v.
Rumsfeld do not raise, as an issue, the constitutionality of the “Don’t
Ask, Don’t Tell” policy.
Given that reality, the issue addressed in this article is the
constitutionality of the Solomon Amendment. This article will
demonstrate that the Solomon Amendment is a proper exercise of the
Spending Clause by the federal government that is within the
Constitution and does not violate the First Amendment rights—academic
freedom—of law professors, law schools, and law students.
This article will begin, in Part I, with the three promulgations which
resulted in the clash of views and, ultimately, the FAIR v. Rumsfeld
lawsuit: the text of the Solomon Amendment and its legislative history;
the text of the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” statute, and then the text and
relevant history of the law schools’ non-discrimination policy which the
law schools assert they would be required to violate if military recruiters
were allowed on-campus access to students. In Part II, this article will
review the decision by the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in
FAIR v. Rumsfeld.
Part III will examine “academic freedom” arguments that have been
advanced by opponents of the Solomon Amendment and demonstrate
that allowing military recruiters onto law school campuses would be
more consistent with the principles of “academic freedom.” Part IV will
show that the Solomon Amendment is within the federal government’s
powers under the Spending Clause. Part V will argue that the
constitutionality of the Solomon Amendment should be subject to a
1

Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights v. Rumsfeld, 390 F.3d 219 (3d Cir.

2004).
2
3

Rumsfeld v. FAIR, 125 S. Ct. 1977 (2005).
Oral arguments are scheduled for Tuesday, December 6, 2005.
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standard of intermediate scrutiny, rather than strict scrutiny as was
applied by the Third Circuit.
I. STATUTES/LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND LAW SCHOOL POLICIES
A. The Solomon Amendment
The Solomon Amendment in its current form, codified in 10 U.S.C.
§ 983, reads:
(b) Denial of funds for preventing military recruiting on
campus.—No funds described in subsection (d)(1) may be
provided by contract or by grant to an institution of higher
education (including any subelement of such institution) if the
Secretary of Defense determines that that institution (or any
subelement of that institution) has a policy or practice (regardless
of when implemented) that either prohibits, or in effect
prevents—
(1) the Secretary of a military department or Secretary
of Homeland Security from gaining access to
campuses, or access to students (who are 17 years of
age or older) on campuses, for purposes of military
recruiting in a manner that is at least equal in quality
and scope to the access to campuses and to students
that is provided to any other employer. . . .
....
(c) Exceptions.—The limitation established in subsection (a) or
(b) shall not apply to an institution of higher education (or any
subelement of that institution) if the Secretary of Defense
determines that—
(1) the institution (and each subelement of that
institution) has ceased the policy or practice described
in that subsection; or
(2) the institution of higher education involved has a
longstanding policy of pacifism based on historical
religious affiliation.
(d) Covered funds.—(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2),
the limitations established in subsections (a) and (b) apply to the
following:
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(A) Any funds made available for the Department of
Defense.
(B) Any funds made available for any department or
agency for which regular appropriations are made in a
Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services,
and Education, and Related Agencies Appropriations
Act.
(C) Any funds made available for the Department of
Homeland Security.
(D) Any funds made available for the National
Nuclear Security Administration of the Department of
Energy.
(E) Any funds made available for the Department of
Transportation.
(F) Any funds made available for the Central
Intelligence Agency.
(2) Any federal funding specified in paragraph (1)
that is provided to an institution of higher education,
or to an individual, to be available solely for student
financial assistance, related administrative costs, or
costs associated with attendance, may be used for the
purpose for which the funding is provided.

The Solomon Amendment was first proposed in the Spring of 1994
by Congressman Gerald B. Solomon, from whom the amendment takes
its common name. Solomon proposed the bill as a means to solve the
problem facing the military as a result of the concerted action by colleges
and universities across the country to prohibit military recruiters on
campus. Solomon recognized that these same institutions were more than
willing to accept research grants and other funding from the Pentagon.4
The bill sought to gain access to college campuses for military recruiters
by conditioning the award of Pentagon funds on the institutions allowing
access to military recruiters. According to the legislative history, the
purpose of the Solomon Amendment was to “not give taxpayer dollars to
institutions . . . interfering with the federal government’s constitutionally
mandated function of raising a military,” while increasing the numbers
recruited of “the most highly qualified candidates from around the
country.”5 Rep. Solomon made clear that his purpose was not to violate
any school’s academic freedom, as the Solomon Amendment left all
schools free to deny military recruiters access to their campus, but the
federal government then could withhold federal funding. He stated:
4
5

140 CONG. REC. H3861 (daily ed. May 23, 1994).
141 CONG. REC. E13-01 (Jan. 4, 1995).

6

SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW

[Vol. 2:001

Tell recipients of Federal money at colleges and universities that
if you do not like the Armed Forces, if you do not like its
policies, that is fine. That is your First Amendment right. But do
not expect Federal dollars to support your interference with our
military recruiters.6

More recently, the House Committee report, in support of the 2004
Amendment, made clear that the purpose of the Solomon Amendment
was to ensure a strong military:
[A]t no time since World War II, has our Nation’s freedom and
security relied more upon our military than now as we engage in
the global war on terrorism. Our Nation’s all volunteer armed
services have been called upon to serve and they are performing
their mission at the highest standard. The military’s ability to
perform at this standard can only be maintained with effective
and uninhibited recruitment programs. Successful recruitment
relies heavily upon the ability of military recruiters to have
access to students on the campuses of colleges and universities
that is equal to other employers.7

The Solomon Amendment, in its original form, was enacted and
signed into law by President Clinton in April 1994.8 Originally the
Solomon Amendment applied only to Department of Defense funds
granted to the particular subelement of a school, e.g., the law school, that
prohibited military recruiting, not the entire school.9 As a practical
matter, this original Solomon Amendment had little bark and no bite.
Since law schools generally did not receive much funding through the
Department of Defense, it did not stop most law schools from continuing
to bar military recruiters from their campuses. And it had little, if any,
effect on the parent institutions, who were the major recipients of
Department of Defense funding, because their Department of Defense
funding was not withheld when a subelement, such as its law school,
blocked military recruiting.
In response to the continued law school prohibition of military
recruiters, Congress, in 1997, amended the Solomon Amendment to
include Departments of Transportation, Labor, Health and Human
Services, and Education funding within the grants and contracts which
the Secretary of Defense was to withhold when an institution prohibited

6

140 CONG. REC. H3861 (daily ed. May 23, 1994).
H.R. REP. NO. 108-443(I), at 3-4 (2004).
8
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995, Pub. L. No. 103-337, §
558, 108 Stat. 2663, 2776 (1994).
9
Id. at § 558.
7
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military recruiters from recruiting on campus.10 While the Solomon
Amendment, with this revision, continued to have an impact only on the
specific part of a university which barred military recruiters, usually the
law school, this change authorized the Secretary of Defense to withhold
federal financial aid from law school students.11 This latter threat led
many law schools to except the military from the nondiscrimination
policy or abandon it altogether.12
In 1999, the Frank-Campbell Amendment was passed, altering the
Solomon Amendment to exclude any impact on financial aid funds or
related administrative costs.13 This resulted in many of the law schools
readopting, and again enforcing, their nondiscrimination policies,
prohibiting the military from recruiting on campus.
In 2000, interim regulations were adopted defining “institution” as
including subelements, which meant that, if a subelement, e.g., the law
school, of a school prohibited military recruiters from recruiting on
campus, federal funds were to be withheld from the entire school.14
After the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the government
recognized an increased need for the nation’s best men and women to
join the military. Strict enforcement of the Solomon Amendment
occurred. The interim regulations were made final in 2003. Schools were
threatened with loss of federal funds on evidence of “outright bans,
prohibitions against recruiting in law school buildings, and other limits
on military recruiters that are more restrictive than for private law
firms.”15 It had the impact which the Solomon Amendment intended:
most schools which had previously discriminated against military
recruiters suddenly renounced the supposed principle of nondiscrimination in favor of the other spelling of principal—meaning
money—and allowed equal access to military recruiters.
Unable to overcome the practical constraints of the Solomon
Amendment, most schools then took the government to court, claiming
the Solomon Amendment violated their First Amendment Rights.16 That
lawsuit resulted in the Third Circuit’s decision in FAIR v. Rumsfeld, and
10

Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208, §
514(b), 110 Stat. 3009-270 (1996).
11
Id.
12
Lindsay Gayle Stevenson, Note, Military Discrimination on the Basis of Sexual
Orientation: “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” and the Solomon Amendment, 37 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
1331, 1352 (2004).
13
Act of Oct. 25, 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-79, § 8120, 113 Stat. 1212, 1260.
14
See 48 C.F.R. § 209.470-1 (2000).
15
Patrick Healy, Despite Concerns, Law Schools Admit Military Recruiters, BOSTON
GLOBE, Nov. 12, 2002, at A1, available at http://www.lawschool100.com/campus
military.htm.
16
FAIR v. Rumsfeld, 390 F.3d 219 (3d Cir. 2004).

8

SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW

[Vol. 2:001

will culminate in a Supreme Court opinion later this Supreme Court
term.
B. Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell
In 1993, Congress enacted, and President Clinton signed into law,
10 U.S.C. § 654, what is commonly known as the “Don’t Ask, Don’t
Tell” policy, making into binding law what had been military policy
concerning homosexuals in the military:
A member of the armed forces shall be separated from the armed
forces under regulations prescribed by the Secretary of Defense if
one or more of the following findings is made . . . .
(1) That the member has engaged in, attempted to engage in, or
solicited another to engage in a homosexual act or acts . . . .
(2) That the member has stated that he or she is a homosexual or
bisexual, or words to that effect . . . .
(3) That the member has married or attempted to marry a person
known to be of the same biological sex. . . .17

C. Law Schools’ Non-Discrimination Policies
For many years, the AALS, an association of more than 160 law
schools, has mandated a non-discrimination policy for its member law
schools. Originally, that policy did not cover sexual orientation, but
prohibited discrimination on what were then the recognized subjects for
opposition to discrimination: national origin, religion, gender, race,
ethnicity, marital status, parental status, veteran status, physical status
and age. Some law schools, on their own, added sexual orientation as a
protected category in the late 1970s and thereafter.18
Virtually every law school in this country revised their nondiscrimination policy to add sexual orientation, when, in 1990, the AALS
did so. Law school non-discrimination policies through the current time
typically use the following or very similar language, committing the law
school “to a policy against discrimination based upon age, color,
handicap or disability, ethnic or national origin, race, religion, religious

17
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-160, §
571(b), 107 Stat. 1547, 1671-72 (1993) (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 654(b) (2000)).
18
FAIR v. Rumsfeld, 291 F. Supp. 2d 269, 280 (D.N.J. 2003).
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creed, gender (including discrimination taking the form of sexual
harassment, marital, parental or veteran status, or sexual orientation).”19
Prior to the inclusion of sexual orientation, the military in fact was
in violation of the law schools’ policies against discrimination based on
age and disability, given that the military will not accept recruits who are
older than 34 for active duty and 39 for reserve duty, nor recruits who are
not able bodied.20 Significantly, there is no report—even through the
current time—of any law school barring military recruiters because of
age or disability discrimination in violation of the law school’s nondiscrimination policies. The battle lines between the military and law
schools, on the subject of violation of law schools’ non-discrimination
policies, were only drawn when sexual orientation was added as a
protected category.
II. FORUM FOR ACADEMIC AND INSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS V. RUMSFELD
Beginning in the 1980s, certain law schools began prohibiting
military recruiters access to their campuses for violating their
nondiscrimination policies.21 The passage of the Solomon Amendment in
1994 created a major conflict between the government and the law
schools. As the Solomon Amendment was amended, the amount of
government funding that the Secretary of Defense could withhold from
law schools increased as the Secretary was commanded by statute to
withhold monies from other departments and then withhold monies from
the parent institution for any discrimination against military recruiters by
a subelement law school.22 Prior to September 11, 2001—in an apparent
attempt by the government to avoid a confrontation—law schools were
not denied federal funds if they accommodated military recruiters by
merely granting them access to their campuses without giving them the
full support and aid in scheduling interviews that was given to employers
which did not violate the law schools’ nondiscrimination policies.23 After
9/11, however, the Department of Defense began requiring that law
schools grant military recruiters the same treatment as given to private
employers.
In 2004, Congress codified this practice into the Solomon
Amendment, amending the statute to penalize law schools and their
parent institutions for failing to provide military recruiters access “in a
19

Id.
U.S. Army Careers & Jobs, http://www.goarmy.com/JobCatList.do?fw=career
index (last visited Nov. 11, 2005).
21
FAIR, 390 F.3d at 225.
22
Id. at 226-27.
23
Id. at 227.
20
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manner that is at least equal in quality and scope to the access to
campuses and students that is provided to any other employer.”24 In
response, FAIR and a few other organizations and individuals sued the
Department of Defense and other government departments, claiming that
the policy violated the First Amendment rights of the law schools, and
sought a preliminary injunction.
A. The Parties
1. The Plaintiffs
The plaintiffs were FAIR, the Society of American Law Teachers,
Inc., the Coalition for Equality, a Boston College Law School student
group, Rutgers Gay and Lesbian Caucus, two law professors and three
law students.25
FAIR members were law schools and entire law faculties that voted
to join FAIR.26 Initially all of the members of FAIR were anonymous,
and declined to disclose their identity. To meet the Government’s motion
to dismiss on lack of standing—to sustain FAIR’s standing would require
a finding that members of the plaintiff association individually “would
otherwise have standing to sue in their own right”27—FAIR first
submitted the FAIR membership list for the court’s in camera review,
i.e., without disclosing the identity of any individual member to
defendants.28 In the end, FAIR amended its complaint to identify two of
its members, a law school and the faculty of another, which was held
“sufficient to establish that FAIR members have standing in their own
right to bring this action.”29
2. The Defendants
Named defendants were the respective cabinet Secretaries of the
Departments of Defense, Education, Labor, Health and Human Services,
Transportation, and Homeland Security.30

24

Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Bill for Fiscal Year 2005, Pub.
L. No. 108-375, § 552, 118 Stat. 1811, 1911 (2004) (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. § 983).
25
FAIR v. Rumsfeld, 291 F. Supp. 2d 269, 274 (D.N.J. 2003).
26
Id. at 286.
27
Id. at 285.
28
Id. at 286 n.6.
29
Id. at 289.
30
Id. at 276.
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B. District Court Decision
The district court denied plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary
injunction as well as the government’s motion to dismiss on ground of
plaintiffs’ lack of standing.31 The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
then heard the appeal.
C. Third Circuit Decision
1. Majority Opinion
Two members of the three-judge Third Circuit panel held that
“FAIR . . . demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of its First
Amendment claims and that it is entitled to preliminary injunctive
relief,” reversing the district court’s decision.32 The majority opinion in
FAIR found that the Solomon Amendment violated the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine by impairing the First Amendment rights of the law
schools.33 The unconstitutional conditions doctrine holds that the
government “may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes
his constitutionally protected interests—especially, his interest in
freedom of speech.”34
The majority decision in FAIR pursued two avenues of analysis in
determining whether the Solomon Amendment violates the First
Amendment interests of the law schools. First, the court considered
whether the law schools constitute “‘expressive associations’ whose First
Amendment right to disseminate their chosen message is impaired by the
inclusion of military recruiters on their campuses.”35 Then, the court
considered whether “the law schools are insulated by free speech
protections from being compelled to assist military recruiters in the
expressive act of recruiting.”36 The Third Circuit applied strict scrutiny
(“A regulation . . . must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling
government interest, and must use the least restrictive means of
promoting the Government’s asserted interest”) rather than intermediate
scrutiny (regulation constitutional if it “furthers an important government
interest that would be achieved less effectively without that action”),
though in the decision the court states that the outcome would be the
same under either scrutiny standard.37 The reasoning in the majority
31
32
33
34
35
36
37

Id. at 322.
FAIR v. Rumsfeld, 390 F.3d 219, 224 (3d Cir. 2004).
See id. at 229-30.
Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972).
FAIR, 390 F.3d at 230.
Id.
Id.
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decision will be explained here and responded to in the later sections of
this article.
a. Expressive Association Analysis
The majority applied the elements of an expressive association
claim as set forth in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale:38 (1) whether the
group is an “expressive association;” (2) whether the state action
significantly affects the group’s ability to advocate its viewpoint, and (3)
whether the state’s interest justifies any burden it imposes on the group’s
expressive association.39 First, the majority relied on Dale for the rule
that a group does not need to exist for the sole purpose of expression to
be considered an “expressive association.”40 In Dale, the Supreme Court
determined the Boy Scouts of America to be an expressive association,
because it “seeks to transmit . . . a system of values [and] engages in
expressive activity.”41 The Third Circuit determined that educational
institutions are similarly an expressive association because one of their
purposes is to instill a system of values in their students.42
The court then examined whether the Solomon Amendment affects
the law schools’ ability to advocate its point of view. Applying its
reading of Dale, the court reasoned that, just as forcing the Boy Scouts to
allow an openly gay scout master would force the Boy Scouts to send a
message that they accept homosexual behavior, contrary to the Scout
Oath, “the presence of military recruiters would, at the very least, force
law schools to send a message both to students and the legal community,
that the law schools accept employment discrimination as a legitimate
form of behavior.”43 The Third Circuit rejected the district court’s
argument that there is a difference between forced inclusion within a
group and the forced periodic presence at a group’s location, finding that
the duration of a burden is not determinative of whether a constitutional
violation has occurred.44 The court concluded that FAIR satisfied the
second element of the unconstitutional conditions claim, because FAIR
offered evidence of their belief that the Solomon Amendment impaired
their ability to present their message, and the court must “‘give deference
to an association’s view of what would impair its expression.’”45

38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45

530 U.S. 640 (2000).
Id. at 648-49.
Id. at 648.
Id. at 650.
FAIR, 390 F.3d at 231.
Id. at 232 (internal quotes omitted).
See id. at 233.
Id. at 233 (quoting Dale, 530 U.S. at 653).
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The Third Circuit then moved on to the third step of the expressive
association claim established in Dale, applying a balancing of the First
Amendment interests affected by the Solomon Amendment with the
government’s interests, to determine whether the statute violates the
Constitution. The Third Circuit did not dispute that the government has a
compelling interest in recruiting talented students to be military
lawyers.46 The district court had determined that intermediate scrutiny
applied, because it found the Solomon Amendment did not directly
burden expressive association rights, but the Third Circuit found that the
Solomon Amendment does in fact directly impair the law schools’
expression and applied strict scrutiny.47 The Third Circuit found that the
Solomon Amendment could not be tailored much more broadly, citing
examples such as television and radio advertisements as alternatives to
recruiting directly on campus.48 The availability of less-restrictive means
alone made the Solomon Amendment unconstitutional under strict
scrutiny analysis, but the Third Circuit also asserted that the
government’s failure to produce any evidence, demonstrating that a
lesser restriction would not achieve the government’s goal of attracting
talented military lawyers, caused the Solomon Amendment to be
unconstitutional under intermediate scrutiny as well.49
The Third Circuit concluded that FAIR’s claim satisfied the
requirements of an expressive association claim, warranting a
preliminary injunction against the government’s enforcement of the
Solomon Amendment, because FAIR had a “reasonable likelihood of
success on the merits of its expressive association claim against the
Solomon Amendment.”50
b. Compelled Speech Analysis
The Third Circuit then pursued a second avenue of analysis,
determining that, in violation of the First Amendment, the Solomon
Amendment compels the law schools to express the government’s views.
The compelled speech doctrine is said to prohibit the government from
forcing a private speaker to advance a message dictated by the
government,51 forcing a private speaker to include another private

46
47
48
49
50
51

Id. at 234.
Id. at 234 n.14.
Id. at 234-35.
Id. at 245.
Id. at 235.
See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 717 (1977).
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speaker’s message,52 or forcing an entity or individual to subsidize an
organization that promotes speech that the entity or individual opposes.53
The Third Circuit concluded that the Solomon Amendment violated all
of these three asserted prohibitions of the compelled speech doctrine.
In order for the Solomon Amendment to violate the compelled
speech doctrine, recruiting must constitute speech. The Third Circuit
found that recruiting is a form of expression, because of the “oral and
written communication that recruiting entails . . . [and] its purpose—to
convince prospective employees that an employer is worth working
for.”54 (The majority opinion did not even consider whether the law
schools, in asserted support of the schools’ academic freedom, were in
fact violating the academic freedom of all students, by prohibiting them
from listening to, on campus, the views expressed by military recruiters.)
The Third Circuit majority stated that the Solomon Amendment compels
law schools to endorse speech from the military, and thereby promote an
employer with whose discriminatory policies the law schools disagree.55
It concluded that this is compelled expression “in all three proscribed
ways: propagation, accommodation, and subsidy,” because the law
schools must promote the military’s message by allowing them to recruit
on campus, accommodate the military’s message by allowing them on
campus, and subsidize the military’s message by using career services
staff to assist the military in getting its message to the students.56
The majority opinion gave no weight to FAIR’s factual admissions
that the AALS had suggested that law schools engage in ameliorative
measures, which would make clear that they oppose the military policy,
to avoid any appearance of law schools’ endorsement of the military’s
discriminatory policy. Those measures included informing students that
“the military discriminates on a basis not permitted by the school’s nondiscrimination rules,” and scheduling “forums or panels for the
discussion of the military policy . . . .”57 The majority also appeared to
have ignored its own finding that “the record is replete with references to
student protesters and public condemnation,”58 as well as its record
recitations of law school “administrators, faculty and students”
criticizing military policies while military recruiters were on campus.59
52
Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian, & Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S.
557, 581 (1995).
53
Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 235 (1977).
54
FAIR, 390 F.3d at 236-37.
55
Id. at 236.
56
Id. at 239-40.
57
FAIR, 291 F. Supp. 2d at 281 (quoting Rosenkranz Decl. ¶ 10, Ex. 3).
58
FAIR, 390 F.3d at 245.
59
Id. at 239.
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Despite these facts and holdings, the Third Circuit questioned
whether the Solomon Amendment prohibits disclaimers, even though it
is clear that law schools are entitled to disclaim and even protest the
military recruiters’ presence on campus—and despite the fact that the
government, in its brief to the Third Circuit, expressly recognized a law
school’s right publicly to disagree with the military. The Third Circuit
concluded that the law schools’ freedom to express their opposing view
is irrelevant because “compelled speech concerns [do not] evaporate if a
speaker can ameliorate the risk of misattribution by disclaiming the
message it is being compelled to propagate.”60
The Third Circuit acknowledged that, even if the Solomon
Amendment does impair the First Amendment rights of law schools by
compelling speech, the statute would still be valid if it survives
scrutiny.61 But the Third Circuit determined that the Solomon
Amendment does not survive strict scrutiny, which it chose as the correct
standard, or even intermediate scrutiny because the Government failed to
show that it cannot recruit effectively without on-campus recruiting, or
that it would recruit less effectively by less speech-restrictive means.62
2. Dissent
In his dissent, Circuit Judge Aldisert would affirm the decision of
the district court.63 Contending that this case is not “a case of First
Amendment protection in the nude,”64 he identified three controlling
issues: (1) whether FAIR “overcom[es] the presumption of
constitutionality of a congressional statute that is . . . bottomed on the
Spending Clause;” (2) whether the law schools’ nondiscrimination
policies are violated by a military recruiter temporarily being present on
campus; and (3) whether, after applying the balancing test, “it can be
concluded that the operation of the First Amendment trumps the several
clauses of Articles I and II relating to the spending power and support of
the military.”65
The dissent began with the recognized presumption that
congressional statutes are constitutional,66 citing the decision in Rust v.
Sullivan67 which states: “As between two possible interpretations of a

60
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65
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Id. at 241.
Id. at 236.
Id. at 242.
Id. at 246 (Aldisert, J., dissenting).
Id. at 246-47.
Id. at 247.
Id. at 248.
500 U.S. 173 (1991).
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statute, by one of which it would be unconstitutional and by the other
valid, our plain duty is to adopt that which would save the Act.”68 While
the majority may literally be correct in disputing that anyone had raised
two interpretations of the Solomon Amendment,69 the dissent’s point is
not that the court should adopt a constitutional interpretation of the
Solomon Amendment, but that the amendment itself is presumed
constitutional unless the objectants first “demonstrate that the mere
presence of recruiting officers on campus constitutes a compellable
inference that the law schools will be objectively and reasonably viewed
as violating their anti-discrimination policies.”70 Even if FAIR had
produced such evidence, the dissent explained that it would then have to
demonstrate that the infringement on law schools’ First Amendment
rights outweighed Congressional interests reflected in provisions of
Article I of the Constitution.71
The dissent argued that the majority failed to take into
consideration many constitutional provisions that support the
government’s interests advanced by the Solomon Amendment and that
predate the adoption of the First Amendment in the Bill of Rights.72 The
dissent cited the Spending Power Clause, which granted “Congress . . .
the Power To lay and collect Taxes . . . to . . . provide for the common
Defense and general Welfare of the United States . . .”73 and the Military
Powers Clause which granted Congress the power “to raise and support
Armies . . . to provide and maintain a Navy . . . [and] to make Rules for
the Government and Regulation of the land and naval forces.”74 And the
dissent referenced the Necessary and Proper Clause, authorizing
Congress “to make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for
carrying into execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers
vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in
any Department or Officer thereof.”75
Referring to these provisions, the dissent asserted that there is no
case in which an act of Congress intended to support the military was
declared unconstitutional by “application of the seminal doctrine that the
government may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes
his constitutionally protected interests.”76 The dissent’s conclusion was
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76

Id. at 190.
See FAIR, 390 F.3d at 229 n.8 (citing Rust, 500 U.S. at 190).
Id. at 250 (Aldisert, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 249.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12-14.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
FAIR, 390 F.3d at 250 (Aldisert, J., dissenting) (internal quotes omitted).
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that, by reversing the district court decision on these grounds, the Third
Circuit had essentially created new law that is not supported by
precedent.77
The dissent first questioned whether the impact of the Solomon
Amendment on law schools’ First Amendment rights—the right not to
appear to be violating their anti-discrimination policy—is even relevant,
because a military recruiter on campus for a few days cannot allow such
an inference.78 However, assuming such an inference were possible, the
dissent addressed whether any “First Amendment concerns trump”
Congress’ adoption of the Solomon Amendment in furtherance of its
performance of its and the President’s duties “under Article I and II to
support the military.”79 The dissent started by citing Roberts v. United
States Jaycees,80 which held that “‘[t]he right to associate for expressive
purposes is not . . . absolute,’” where there are “‘compelling state
interests, unrelated to the suppression of idea, that cannot be achieved
through means significantly less restrictive of associational freedoms.’”81
The dissent identified the two “competing interests” that have to be
balanced: the “interest in public safety [as] expressed in clauses of
Articles I and II of the Constitution relating to support of the military”
and “the interest in free speech [as] found in the First Amendment.”82
In applying this balancing test, the dissent pointed out that the
Supreme Court has “consistently deferred to congressional decisions
relating to the military” due to the broad constitutional powers delegated
to Congress and the lack of competence of the courts in determining such
issues.83 Considering the arguments advanced by FAIR that the military
could attract their candidates without stepping on the campus, the dissent
explained that this is not in harmony with the concepts of a level playing
field, since private law firms, who have resources available comparable
to the military, yet are more attractive due to their higher pay and
bonuses, are afforded complete access on campus.84 Because the military
will inevitably be damaged in its recruiting pursuits without access to
law school campuses, the dissent concluded that the balance was in favor
of the Solomon Amendment, particularly, because “‘the validity of such
regulations does not turn on a judge’s agreement with the responsible
77
78
79
80
81

623).
82
83
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Id.
Id. at 253.
Id.
468 U.S. 609 (1984).
FAIR, 390 F.3d at 253 (Aldisert, J., dissenting) (quoting U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. at
Id. at 254.
Id.
Id. at 255.
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decisionmaker concerning the most appropriate method for promoting
significant government interests.’”85
a. Compelled Speech Claim86
Turning to FAIR’s compelled speech claim, the dissent rejected
FAIR’s reliance on Hurley, reasoning that “nothing in Hurley suggests
that the Solomon Amendment crosses the line into unconstitutionality.”87
The dissent argued that recruiting, though it involves speaking, is more
of an economic transaction; “the expression is entirely subordinate to the
transaction itself.”88 Also, the dissent explained that, in Hurley, the
Supreme Court had found that the group sought to march “‘as a way to
express pride in . . . [being] openly gay, lesbian and bisexual
individuals’”—i.e., to convey a pro-homosexuality message.89 Further,
its participation in the parade “‘would likely be perceived as having
resulted from the [parade organizers’] customary determination about a
unit admitted to the parade, that its message was worthy of presentation
and quite possibly of support as well,’” because the “‘role of the parade
organizers . . . consisted of choosing the messages that would comprise
the parade,’” suggesting that the message of a chosen marching group
“would be attributed to the organizers themselves.”90
The dissent pointed out that in FAIR, unlike Hurley, the expression
is a subsidiary part of the activity, whereas in Hurley the expression (the
parade) was the activity.91 It contrasted “bystanders watching a passing
parade,” with “law school students and . . . their professors [who] are an
extraordinarily sophisticated and well-informed group” who would not
likely “perceive a military recruiter’s on-campus activities as reflecting
the school’s . . . determination” that it gives a stamp of approval to the
military’s message.92 Further, the “likelihood that the military’s
recruiting will be seen as part of a law school’s own message is
particularly small when schools can take—and have taken—ameliorative
steps to publicize their continuing disagreement with the military’s
85

Id. (citing United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 689 (1985)).
The dissent concluded that, in evaluating this and the expressive association claim,
the correct standard is intermediate scrutiny, contrary to the majority’s choice of strict
scrutiny. Id. at 246-62 (majority opinion). While the majority held that it would reach the
same conclusion of unconstitutionality under either scrutiny standard, id. at 244, the
dissent did not consider the result under strict scrutiny.
87
Id. at 256 (Aldisert, J., dissenting).
88
Id.
89
Id. (citing Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian, & Bisexual Group of Boston,
515 U.S. 557, 561 (1995)).
90
Id. at 256-57 (quoting Hurley, 515 U.S. at 572).
91
Id. at 256.
92
Id. at 257.
86
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policies . . . .”93 The dissent concluded that the holding in Hurley did not
apply to prevent judicial deference to Congress on military matters.94
b. Expressive Association Claim
The dissent then responded to the majority’s finding of merit in
FAIR’s expressive association claim. The dissent explained that, while
the First Amendment does protect expressive associations, “the Supreme
Court has required a close relationship between the [government] action
and the affected expressive activity to find a constitutional violation.”95
The dissent found that the impact of the Solomon Amendment on the law
schools’ interests of expression to be extremely remote and not to violate
the First Amendment.96 Applying the balancing test, the government’s
interests present in the Solomon Amendment outweigh the remote and
incidental infringements on the First Amendment rights of the law
schools.97
The dissent dissected the cases relied on by the majority to show
that they are inapposite to the issue of military recruiters. The dissent
explained that those cases involved governmental requirements that
private entities or persons pay for someone else’s speech or
advertisements,98 whereas the Solomon Amendment does not require law
schools to pay anything to the government.99 Further, the dissent
explained that, even if the schools were required to give payments to the
government to support the military’s recruiting efforts, there was
precedent to allow more latitude for compelled support of government
speech than private speech.100
* * *
This article will now examine in some detail criticisms of
majority decision, expanding on some of the arguments found in
dissent, and advancing other arguments for the conclusion that
Solomon Amendment was improperly determined to violate
Constitution in FAIR v. Rumsfeld.
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Id.
Id.
95
Id. (citing Pi Lamda Phi Fraternity, Inc. v. Univ. of Pittsburgh, 229 F.3d 435, 438
(3d Cir. 2000)).
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Id. at 257.
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Id.
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See id. at 258.
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See id.
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See id. (citing Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 259 (1977)).
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III. THE SOLOMON AMENDMENT FURTHERS — DOES NOT VIOLATE —
ACADEMIC FREEDOM
The sine qua non of the Third Circuit majority decision is that the
Solomon Amendment violates the law schools’ academic freedom – the
protection afforded by the First Amendment to school communities. It is
only that conclusion that allowed the Third Circuit to hold the Solomon
Amendment unconstitutional as violating academic freedom. If it did not
violate academic freedom, the Solomon Amendment must be held to be
constitutional.
In fact, the Solomon Amendment enhances academic freedom,
rather than violating it. The Solomon Amendment uses the power of the
federal purse to require law schools to allow students on campus the
freedom to hear the message of military recruiters to the same extent they
are permitted to hear the message of other recruiters. The law schools
seek to continue to exclude military recruiters—i.e., not permit students
the option to hear their message—because the law schools do not agree
with the military’s “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy.
The law schools assert that their reason for excluding military
recruiters is that military qualifications for employment, i.e., the “Don’t
Ask, Don’t Tell” policy, require rejection of gay people, and thus
violates the law schools’ non-discriminatory policy which bars
discrimination based on sexual orientation.
Even if that were an accurate representation of the law schools’
motive, it would only mean that the law schools seek to impede military
recruiters, who represent a view different from the law schools’ view on
the usefulness of gay persons to the military, from expressing the
military’s view to students who wish to hear it. The law schools’ nondiscrimination policy, to the extent it expresses the law schools’ opinion
on that issue, is nothing more than just that—its expression of its opinion
on an issue on which students are entitled to disagree, if academic
freedom has any meaning. Unlike some of the other categories included
in the law schools’ non-discrimination policy (e.g., discrimination based
on race), which are designated by statute as illegal, the military’s “Don’t
Ask, Don’t Tell” policy is not only not proscribed by law, but has been
enacted by Congress, signed into law by President Clinton,101 and upheld

101
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-160,
107 Stat. 1547, 1671-72 (1993) (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 654(b) (2000)).
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by each of the courts102 that have considered an attack on its
constitutionality.103
While not directly relevant, there are circumstances that strongly
suggest that the law schools, in their opposition to military recruiters, are
merely attempting to create pressure on the government to revoke the
“Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy, and not because the law schools are
seeking to prevent violation of their non-discrimination policies. As
already discussed,104 law schools’ non-discrimination policies purport
also to preclude employers who discriminate on the basis of “age” and
“handicap or disability.” Although the military will not accept recruits
older than 34 for active duty,105 and those who are not able-bodied106
(obvious “violations” of law schools’ non-discrimination policies), no
law school has cited those violations as a reason for excluding military
recruiters. The apparent reason: acceptance that the military can exercise
its judgment to decide that over-age and disabled persons are not
consistent with an efficiently performing military. But law schools refuse
to accept the judgment of the military (and Congress) that gays are not
consistent with an efficiently performing military. What is the
difference? Clearly the answer is that equal treatment of gays is a frontburner politically-correct issue. Looked at in that manner, all law schools
have the right to demonstrate and lobby Congress for a change in
military policy towards gays, but those who disagree have an equal right
to express themselves—including by listening to the message of military
recruiters on campus.
The law schools’ and the Third Circuit’s claim that the Solomon
Amendment violates academic freedom by requiring law schools to
allow military recruiters on campus makes a mockery of academic
freedom (Freedom of Speech) as defined by the Supreme Court.107 The
102
See Able v. United States, 155 F.3d 628 (2d Cir. 1998); Richenberg v. Perry, 97
F.3d 256 (8th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 807 (1997); Thomasson v. Perry, 80 F.3d
915 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 948 (1996).
103
This view is not inconsistent with university administrators’ responsibility to
exercise appropriate authority over student actions to prevent illegal or other disruptive
conduct on campus. Military recruiters on campus does not fit within such conduct.
104
See supra text accompanying note 19.
105
U.S. Army Careers & Jobs, http://www.goarmy.com/JobCatList.do?fw=career
index (last visited Nov. 11, 2005).
106
Id.
107
Most of the defining of academic freedom has been done by the courts in the
context of state action, including state schools. While non-state schools may well have
the right to violate the academic freedom of their students, as the Civil Rights statutes in
this context apply only to state action, these cases provide the courts’ definition of
academic freedom. That definition must be applied to determine if there is any merit to
the law schools’ assertion of violation of academic freedom by the Solomon Amendment.
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Supreme Court has repeatedly held that an essential element of the First
Amendment is the right to “‘receive information and ideas’”108—the very
right the law schools wish to withhold from students by preventing
students from hearing the military “information and ideas” on campus.
This freedom to receive information that a person wishes to hear “is a
necessary predicate to the recipient’s meaningful exercise of his own
rights of speech, press and political freedom.”109 And “[a]t the heart of
the First Amendment lies the principle that each person should decide for
him or herself the ideas and beliefs deserving of expression,
consideration, and adherence.”110 No reason exists to exclude from that
First Amendment protection the law students’ right to “decide for
himself or herself” whether the military recruiter’s message is “deserving
of expression, consideration and” acceptance.111
As the Supreme Court recognized, “this right is ‘nowhere more
vital’ than in our schools and universities. The college classroom with its
surrounding environs is particularly the ‘marketplace of ideas,’”112 which
is at the heart of academic freedom.113 A marketplace of ideas requires a
“wide exposure to that robust exchange of ideas which discovers truth
‘out of a multitude of tongues, [rather] than through any kind of
authoritative selection.’”114 The objective is that “students must always
remain free to inquire, to study and to evaluate . . . .”115 “In our system,
students may not be regarded as closed-circuit recipients of only that
which the [school] chooses to communicate. They may not be confined
to the expression of those sentiments that are officially approved.”116
Based on these Supreme Court definitions of academic freedom, it
is clear that what the law schools are asking the courts to permit is the
opposite of academic freedom. The law schools seek to deny students the
option to hear the military recruiters’ “information and ideas,” deny
military recruiters access to the “market place of ideas” on campus, and
deny students the freedom to “inquire” of military recruiters, to “study”
the military recruiters’ message, and “to evaluate” those ideas.
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Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762 (1972) (quoting Stanley v. Georgia, 394
U.S. 557, 564 (1969)).
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Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 867 (1982).
110
Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994).
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Kleindienst, 408 U.S. at 763 (quoting Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487
(1960)).
113
Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180-81 (1972).
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Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (quoting United States v.
Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943)).
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Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957).
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Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969).
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The law schools’ position that they have the right to protect their
academic freedom against being forced to associate with military
recruiters and military policies is meritless. Assuming arguendo117 that
law schools, qua institutions, are forced to associate with military
recruiters, it would not alter the reality that academic freedom is
enhanced by protecting the students’ right to hear the military message, if
they choose to do so.
Simply put, what the law schools assert is that, because they do not
agree with the military’s policy, they have a right to prevent students
who wish to hear the military’s message to do so. It is axiomatic that it is
the antithesis of academic freedom for one group of students and faculty
members (the FAIR plaintiffs) to prevent the dissemination of a message
that other students wish to hear, merely because the FAIR plaintiffs
disagree with the message.
At the heart of the fallacy inherent in the law schools’ position is
that they see academic freedom as primarily for the benefit of
administration and faculty (and those students who agree with the
administration), with academic freedom of students restrictable through
administration-proclaimed self-serving definitions of politically correct
and acceptable forms of thought and speech designed to limit free
expression on campus. To the contrary, academic freedom is not the
exclusive property of law school administrations and some group of
faculty members. Colleges exist for the education of students, with
students being the primary beneficiaries of academic freedom. The law
school administrations are the fiduciaries of that right, with the duty to
implement it for the benefit of the students.
Board of Education, Island Trees Union Free School District No.
26 v. Pico,118 provides precedent for how FAIR should have been
decided. In that case, the Supreme Court recognized that schools have a
right to establish their curriculum in furtherance of their “‘legitimate . . .
interest in promoting . . . values be they social, moral, or political’” on
their students without interference from the government.119 This is
analogous to FAIR’s arguments regarding the law schools’ right to
disseminate a message against the military’s discrimination on the basis
of sexual orientation. But significantly, in Pico, the Supreme Court did
not extend the school’s right to control curriculum to the content of the
library. The Court distinguished between the classroom and the library.
The library was for voluntary exposure to speech, whereas the classroom
117

See infra pp. 32-34 for a discussion as to why no violation of law schools’ right of
association occurs merely because law schools allow military recruiters on campus.
118
457 U.S. 853 (1982).
119
Id. at 864 (quoting Pet’r-Appellee’s Br. 10).
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curriculum was mandated by the school. Because library “books . . . by
their nature are optional rather than required reading” for students, the
Court held that a school board did not have the right to prevent students
from being exposed, in the library, to ideas with which the school board
disagreed.120 The Court further held that “‘school officials cannot
suppress expressions of feeling with which they do not wish to
contend.’”121
Similarly, the Solomon Amendment ensures that students have
access to the military message, if they desire to hear it. The Solomon
Amendment does not dictate what law schools may teach in the
classroom. Law schools that attempt to block military presence at
employment fairs is due to those law schools’ disagreement with the
military’s policies. It is equivalent to the school board in Pico attempting
to remove books from the library because the board disagreed with the
books’ messages. In Pico, the Court held that a local school board has
discretion “to add to the libraries of their schools . . . [but not] . . . the
discretion to remove books” where the purpose is the suppression of
ideas.122 The law schools’ barring of military recruiters was equivalent of
what the Supreme Court held improper in Pico: the removal of an
employer to suppress the ideas espoused by that recruiter—an attempt to
prevent students from hearing these ideas, because the administration
disagreed with that recruiter’s message.
An employment fair, like a library, is dependent on students
voluntarily seeking out a message. To the extent law schools have a right
to instill their message and values in their students, such right may not
extend to barring students from obtaining the message of others,
including at an employment fair. As Pico held, to the extent the school
administrations attempt to block students’ access to other viewpoints, it
is the law schools, not the government, that are violating the academic
freedom of its students.
Further, the Supreme Court has made clear that the responsibility of
college administrations is to protect students’ academic freedom rights,
not those of the administration. In affording prime importance to
students’ right to hear “a diversity of views from”123 speakers, the Court
explained:
The quality and creative power of student intellectual life to this
day remains a vital measure of a school’s influence and
attainment. For the University, by regulation, to cast disapproval
120
121
122
123

Id. at 862, 871.
Id. at 868 (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 511).
Id. at 871-72.
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 834 (1995).

2005]

The Solomon Amendment Is Constitutional

25

on particular viewpoints of its students risks the suppression of
free speech and creative inquiry in . . . its college and university
campuses.124

The Supreme Court has recognized, in analogous situations, that it
is the First Amendment rights of the patrons of the institution, not the
institution itself, which must be protected. In the context of a library, the
Supreme Court declined to decide whether or not the library itself had a
First Amendment right or whether, assuming one, it was violated;
instead, it focused on whether “their patrons’ First Amendment Rights”
had been violated, because they were the ultimate beneficiaries of free
speech rights in a library context.125 Likewise, in the law school context,
students are the ultimate beneficiaries, whose academic freedom rights
are not restricted, but enhanced by being allowed to hear the views of
diverse recruiters, including the military.
In the corporate context, as well, the Supreme Court recognized that
the entity’s First Amendment rights were subordinate to that of the
corporate “members”—the shareholders. It held that SEC “regulations
that limit management’s ability to exclude some shareholders’ views
from corporate communications do not infringe corporate First
Amendment rights.”126 So too, in the broadcasting context, the Court
rejected broadcasters’ claim that their First Amendment rights were
violated when the FCC required them to allow fair comment by any
persons attacked by broadcasters, holding “[i]t is the right of the viewers
and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount.”127
It is no answer to argue that students remain free to hear the
message of military recruiters off campus.128 The same could have been
said about the ability of students in Pico to go to a non-school library or
a book store to obtain the book banned in Pico. That would not suffice
from an academic freedom standpoint, because “[t]he school library—
sponsored, financed, and supervised by the school—is the principal locus
of [students’] freedom” to “‘inquire, to study and to evaluate”129—just as
the employment fair, sponsored, financed, and supervised by the school,
is the principal locus of students’ freedom to inquire, study and evaluate
employment opportunities. To paraphrase the Supreme Court’s
explanation in Pico: listening to military recruiters “is completely

124
125
126
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Id. at 836.
United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, Inc., 539 U.S. 194, 214 (2003).
Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 475 U.S. 1, 15 n.10 (1986).
Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
Cf. FAIR, 390 F.3d 219, 235 (3d Cir. 2004).
Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 868-69 (1982).
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voluntary on the part of students.”130 Their selection of which recruiters
to listen to at the law school’s employment fair “is entirely a matter of
free choice;” the employment fairs “afford them an opportunity . . . that
is wholly optional.”131 The Pico Court held that to the extent that the
school administration “intended by their . . . decision to deny [students]
access to ideas with which [the administration] disagreed, . . . then [the
school administration] have exercised their discretion in violation of the
Constitution.”132 A fortiori, this reasoning, applied to junior high school
and high school students, must control the definition of academic
freedom as to law schools’ preventing law school students from hearing
the message of military recruiters.
An argument that academic freedom of students is not violated by
denial of campus facilities as long as the students can pursue their goals
off campus, was expressly rejected by the Supreme Court in Healy v.
James.133 There, a college president, opposed to the message of a student
group, refused to allow its use of campus facilities to meet. The
president’s conduct was held inconsistent with the need to maintain and
protect the “marketplace of ideas” and safeguard academic freedom.134
The ability of this student group to meet off campus did not “ameliorate
significantly the disabilities imposed by the president’s action.”135 So
too, the law schools’ violation of academic freedom in refusing to allow
students to hear the military recruiters’ message on campus is not
ameliorated by the ability of students to hear that message off campus.
In the end, FAIR relies, for its academic freedom violation claim,
on the undisputed rule that the government may not “discriminate against
speech on the basis of its viewpoint.”136 In fact, no such violation of the
law schools’ speech rights occurs because each law school can continue
to speak freely against military policy. But, to sustain FAIR’s position
requires a holding that the law schools can “discriminate against [the
military’s] speech on the basis of its viewpoint” on homosexuals in the
military. That finding would make a mockery of academic freedom,
Thus, contrary to the assertion that the Solomon Amendment violates
academic freedom, which was the desideratum of the Third Circuit’s
decision, it is the law schools which are violating academic freedom and
the Solomon Amendment which is protecting it.
130
131
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133
134
135
136
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IV. THE SOLOMON AMENDMENT IS A PROPER EXERCISE OF
CONGRESSIONAL POWER UNDER THE SPENDING CLAUSE
As recently as 2003, in United States v. American Library Ass’n,137
the Supreme Court held that “Congress has wide latitude to attach
conditions to the receipt of federal assistance in order to further its policy
objectives.”138 This was not new law, but a reaffirmation of a longstanding rule.139 The Court explained that the only limitation on that
power is that Congress thereby “may not ‘induce’ the recipient ‘to
engage in activities that would themselves be unconstitutional.’”140 That
limitation, known as the “unconstitutional conditions doctrine”—on
which the Third Circuit majority relied—requires a determination of
“whether the condition that Congress requires ‘would . . . be
unconstitutional’ if performed by the [law school] itself.”141
Applying that test, there could be nothing unconstitutional about the
Solomon Amendment as, without dispute, law schools would not be
acting in an unconstitutional manner if they allowed military recruiters
on campus. Both the Third Circuit and the district court held the
American Library Ass’n rule inapplicable because the Solomon
Amendment did not withhold funds from a specific spending program
which contained the condition, but affected all funds under all programs
run by each of the government departments.142
With due deference to both of those courts, this exclusion of the
government interests, as expressed in the Solomon Amendment, from the
government’s right to condition its funding on what Congress believes is
necessary to support government policies, is simplistic and therefore
erroneous. Without the protection of our military forces, our government
would not exist. In that event, no governmental department would exist,
and thus no funding of law schools and other institutions of higher
learning could then be given. The Constitution and Supreme Court
decisions make clear that military recruitment—which the Solomon
Amendment was intended to assist—is a fundamental and overriding
public interest that has as its aim the preservation of our country’s very
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539 U.S. 194 (2003).
Id. at 203 (citing South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206 (1987)).
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See, e.g., Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 575 (1984) (“Congress is free
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existence.143 Hence, Congress’s conditioning of funds for learning
institutions on law schools not impeding the government’s ability to
recruit able persons for the military, is, in reality, related to all and each
funding made by each government department. It cannot be that the
Supreme Court would insist on form over substance by requiring
Congress to include in each approval of appropriation for a funding
program the boilerplate of “reliance on our military for the ability to
make educational grants,” or words to that effect, in order to recognize
that reality. Hence, under American Library Ass’n, the Solomon
Amendment condition was constitutional.
In any event, Congress has previously used its power of the purse to
condition federal funding for educational institutions on compliance with
federal policies unrelated to the specific federal funding. For example,
Congress has conditioned federal funding on no sexual discrimination144
and no racial discrimination.145 No one has even suggested those statutes,
of general impact on all federal funding, are unconstitutional because
they were not limited to the specific funding program. And although the
anti-sexual discrimination statute barred funding by “[e]ach Federal
department and agency which is empowered to extend Federal financial
assistance to any education program”146—i.e., not related to a specific
program—it was held constitutional.147
Significantly, even if the lower courts were correct in holding that
American Library Ass’n was inapplicable because the Solomon
Amendment was not limited to a single program, the Solomon
Amendment still should not be held to impose an unconstitutional
condition. First, the principle inherent in American Library Ass’n, of the
“wide latitude” that is recognized that Congress has “to attach conditions
on the receipt of federal assistance,”148 remains the rule and, applied to
the Solomon Amendment, makes it constitutional.
Second, the military recruiter’s message, which the law schools
assert is violating their First Amendment rights through forcing them to
be associated with it, is clearly the government’s own message. In the
recent decision Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Ass’n,149 the Supreme
Court expressly held that “the Government’s own speech . . . is exempt
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See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 12-13; 10 U.S.C. § 503(a) (2000); Grutter v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 331 (2003); United States v. O’Brien, 371 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
144
20 U.S.C. §§ 1681(a), 1682 (2000).
145
42 U.S.C. § 2000(d) (2000 & Supp. I 2001).
146
20 U.S.C. § 1682 (2000).
147
See Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555 (1984).
148
United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194, 203 (2003).
149
125 S. Ct. 2055 (2005).

2005]

The Solomon Amendment Is Constitutional

29

from First Amendment scrutiny”150 in a context analogous—indeed, a
fortiori—to that in the FAIR case. In Johanns, the plaintiffs objected to
being required to fund advertising by a private sector group, but for the
government’s purpose and approved by the government.151 Those
plaintiffs objected that it “unconstitutionally compel[led] [them] to
subsidize speech to which they object,”152 and provide “their seeming
endorsement to promote a message with which they do not agree.”153
Similarly, the FAIR plaintiffs objected to being compelled to provide
room, staff and services to the military speech to which they objected,
and thus, they claim, appear to endorse it. Noting that all prior “First
Amendment challenges to . . . compelled expression” had not involved
“government compelled subsidy of the government’s own speech,”154 the
Court held those prior decisions irrelevant where it is government speech
asserted to violate the plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights. Given that
recent decision, the FAIR plaintiffs may not object to military recruiters,
i.e., government speech, on campus as a violation of plaintiffs’ First
Amendment rights.
Third, the four cases155 on which the majority in the Third Circuit
relied, to hold the Solomon Amendment to be an unconstitutional
condition, are inapposite; they each involved direct sanction for, or
restriction of, speech. In Perry v. Sindermann,156 the administration of a
state junior college declined to renew a professor’s contract, due to, he
asserted, his exercise of his free speech right in “his testimony before
legislative committees and his other statements critical of the Regents’
policies.”157 Speiser v. Randall158 likewise involved denial of a benefit
(there, a tax exemption) “for engaging in certain speech.”159 Rosenberger
v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia160 also involved a
state university’s administration penalizing a student organization
because of its viewpoint.
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The fourth case cited by the Third Circuit majority, FCC v. League
of Women Voters,161 expressly conditioned receipt of federal funds by
non-commercial broadcasting stations on their not expressing their
opinions in broadcasting, i.e., imposing a direct prohibition on “a form of
speech—namely the expression of editorial opinion—that lies at the
heart of First Amendment protection.”162 Indeed, the Court described
what was at stake in that case as “the liberty to discuss publicly . . . .
Freedom of discussion.”163
Unlike what was found unconstitutional in each of these four cases,
the Solomon Amendment does not prohibit law schools from expressing
their opinion on military policy or otherwise penalize the law schools for
their speech or expression of views. Indeed, the right of all law schools
to speak out against military policy is unaffected by the Solomon
Amendment.164
It is ironic that the Third Circuit majority should purport to rely on
these four cases because the rationale of those opinions is the antithesis
of the law schools’ position on the Solomon Amendment: that they have
the right to prevent their students from exercising their academic
freedom to listen to the views of military recruiters if the students wanted
to do so.
For example, to paraphrase the Supreme Court’s holding in
Rosenberger, the law schools’ “denial of [the military’s] request for
[equal treatment] . . . is based upon viewpoint discrimination.”165 And
“[f]or the University, by regulation, to cast disapproval on particular
viewpoints of its students”—such as those who wish to hear the
military’s message—“risks the suppression of free speech and creative
inquiry in one of the vital centers for the nation’s intellectual life, its
college and university campuses.”166
Each of those four cases held unconstitutional an actual restraint on
speech. The FAIR plaintiffs do not claim that the Solomon Amendment
imposes any restraint of anyone’s speech. Rather, they claim that the law
schools’ right of association is violated by the Solomon Act, which, they
say, pressures the law schools into associating with, and thus endorsing,
the military policies with which they disagree, merely by allowing
military recruiters to be one of many employers appearing on campus to
be interviewed by those students who wish to sign up.
161
162
163
164
165
166
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Also, in Speiser, the Supreme Court, in holding unconstitutional a
loyalty oath as a condition to obtain a tax exemption, explained that a
loyalty oath has been held constitutional where “there was no attempt
directly to control speech but rather to protect . . . some interest clearly
within the sphere of governmental concern. . . . [i.e.,] a congressional
purpose . . . to achieve an objective other than restraint of speech.”167 No
one disputes that the Solomon Amendment’s purpose was not to restrain
speech—indeed the Third Circuit majority so assumed168—but to further
an interest clearly within the sphere of governmental concern: military
recruitment, which, as previously shown,169 is necessary to the
preservation of our country. FAIR conceded that the “government’s
interest in raising an army is important, even compelling . . . and so, too,
we can presume is its interest in hiring JAG lawyers.”170 And, as
previously discussed,171 the Solomon Amendment does not in any way
limit each law school’s freedom to make clear its opposition to military
policies.
The Third Circuit held itself bound, by the Supreme Court decision
in Dale, to give conclusive deference to the law schools’ assertion that
the presence of military recruiters on campus would impair the law
schools’ non-discrimination message.172 To the contrary, Dale made
explicit that a mere assertion of an associational rights violation is not
sufficient to require a finding to that effect:
[T]he freedom of expressive association . . . is not absolute.173

and
That is not to say that an expressive association can erect a shield
. . . simply by asserting that mere acceptance of a member from a
particular group would impair its message.174

Rather, to paraphrase the Dale opinion, it would have impact on a statute
only if “the forced inclusion of [a military recruiter] would significantly
affect the [law schools’] ability to advocate public or private
viewpoints.”175 Thus, the Solomon Amendment does not impose an
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impact because law schools continue to be free to voice their objections
to military policies.
In addition, both practical knowledge and controlling Supreme
Court authority reject the argument that law schools, by allowing
military recruiters, among a multitude of other recruiters, to interview
students on campus, create a message that those law schools are
endorsing the military. No law student (and for that matter no employer)
believes that a law school is endorsing any particular employer by
arranging for many employers to interview students on campus. For
example, recruiters may interview on behalf of the National Organization
for Women (pro-abortion) as well as on behalf of an anti-abortion legal
group, obviously without any suggestion of endorsement of either
position. Can you imagine a law school agreeing that it endorses each
employer that interviewed on campus, and thus is liable to a student who
suffered financial loss after accepting an employment offer from an
employer who became bankrupt before the employment commenced? Of
course not; and students who have found themselves in this unfortunate
situation (which has occurred) have never even suggested that the law
school was at fault. There is no reason to treat military recruiters’
participation in employment fairs any differently.
It would defy logic for anyone to contend that any law school
would be taken as endorsing the policies espoused by a pro-life or a prochoice speaker, invited to speak on campus and permitted to use school
facilities, including the room in which to speak, the school bulletin board
to announce the speech, and, often, school funds allotted for such
speakers. Likewise, it defies logic to assume that anyone believes that a
law school endorses the policies of any specific employer among the
hundreds seeking the opportunity to be interviewed by any students who
wish to hear the employer’s message.
The Supreme Court has itself recognized that no endorsement of the
military message comes from allowing the military recruiters equal
access to students. In Rosenberger, on which the Third Circuit relied, the
Supreme Court declared:
A holding that the University may not discriminate based on the
viewpoint of private persons whose speech it facilitates does not
restrict the University’s own speech . . . . The distinction between
the University’s own favored message and the private speech of
students is evident . . . .176

The Supreme Court necessarily found that no violation of associational
rights of a school results from allowing students the option to hear, in
176
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school, a message with which the school administration disagrees, even
though the school provides the space, pays for it, and provides the staff
to run it. In Pico,177 the school was required to allow students the option
to read books in the school library, even though the school administration
disagreed with the message of certain books. It was a given that the
school facilities (the library) would be used, paid for by the school, and
that school staff operated the library. Yet, no violation of any
associational right of the schools was found.
So too, in Healy v. James,178 the decision of the president of a
college to bar a student group from using campus facilities to convey its
message, because the president did not want the college associated with
that message, was held unconstitutional. And, to paraphrase the Supreme
Court’s opinion in Widmar v. Vincent, “[i]n light of the large number of
[recruiters] meeting on campus, however, we doubt students could draw
any reasonable inference of University support from the mere fact of a
campus meeting place.”179
The Supreme Court reached the same conclusion even as to high
school students, who are, by definition, less mature than the college and
graduate students affected by the Solomon Amendment, stating:
We think that secondary school students are mature enough and
are likely to understand that a school does not endorse or support
. . . speech that it merely permits on a nondiscriminatory basis. 180

In analogous, but non-school, situations, the Supreme Court has
held that no endorsement of views exists when an entity gives access to
its premises for the expression of a differing view. In PruneYard
Shopping Center v. Robins,181 the Supreme Court rejected the
suggestion—similar to that made by FAIR in attacking the Solomon
Amendment as unconstitutional—that the First Amendment association
rights of a shopping center owner would be violated by being compelled
to allow individuals to express themselves on its property. In reasoning
which appears directly applicable to the attack on the Solomon
Amendment and the presence of the military on campus, the Supreme
Court explained:
The views expressed by members of the public in passing out
pamphlets or seeking signatures for a petition . . . will not likely
be identified with those of the owner. . . . [Also the owner] can
177
178
179
180
181
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expressly disavow any connection with the message by simply
posting signs in the area where the speakers or handbillers
stand.182

The law schools are able to disavow any agreement or connection with
the military recruiters, and have in fact done so,183 thereby avoiding any
association with the military’s views.
In Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, the Supreme Court
rejected the argument that television cable system operators, if required
to carry certain broadcast stations, would be associated with the ideas of
those stations:
Given cable’s long history of serving as a conduit for broadcast
signals, there appears little risk that cable viewers would assume
that the broadcast stations carried on a cable system convey ideas
or messages endorsed by the cable operator.184

Rationally, no difference exists between employers allowed to convey
their respective message on campus and broadcast stations being able to
convey their respective message on cable.
Significantly, the Court appears unanimous that an institution does
not become associated with the message of any one of many allowed to
present themselves to students. For example, to quote the dissenting
opinion of the four “liberal” justices (Breyer, Ginsburg, Souter and
Stevens) in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale (altered only to apply that
dissenting opinion to law schools):
[I]t is not likely that [any law school] would be understood to
send any message . . . simply by admitting someone as a
[recruiter]. . . . The notion that an organization of that size and
enormous prestige implicitly endorses the views that each of
those [recruiters] may express . . . is simply mind boggling.185

Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of
Boston186 and Boy Scouts of America v. Dale,187 in which the Supreme
Court upheld the associational rights of organizations to exclude views
with which the organization disagreed, are inapposite to the Solomon
Amendment, contrary to the Third Circuit’s reliance on them. The
plaintiff in Hurley, an homosexual, objected to being excluded from a
parade, which was limited to those who agreed with the organizer’s
182
183
184
185
186
187
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message. The parade organizer’s position was no different from what the
response would be by a Democratic Party parade in rejecting a
Republican seeking to participate. The Court held that the parade
organization was not “merely ‘a conduit’ for the speech of participants in
the parade,” but “itself a speaker.”188 In that parade context, an
homosexual’s “participation would likely be perceived as having resulted
from the [sponsor’s] customary determination about a unit admitted to
the parade, that its message was worthy of presentation and quite
possible of support as well.”189 No such perception would be warranted
from military recruiters’ appearance on campus, as it is recognized that
the purpose of employment fairs is not for the law school to convey an
overall message, but an opportunity for students to hear the employment
messages of each recruiter.
The Boy Scouts in Dale excluded an homosexual who sought a
special leadership role as an assistant scoutmaster, thereby compromising
the Boy Scouts’ message on homosexuality.190 At employment fairs, in
contrast, no special position is given to any one of many recruiters, and
no recruiter is an official or representative of the school.
This analysis establishes that the Solomon Amendment does not
infringe law schools’ freedom of speech or associational rights. But, even
assuming, arguendo, that the Solomon Amendment “does work some
slight infringement on [law schools’] right of expressive association, that
infringement is justified because it serves the State’s compelling
interest.”191 The Supreme Court has stated that an infringement “may be
justified by [statutes and] regulations adopted to serve compelling state
interests, unrelated to the suppression of idea, that cannot be achieved
through means significantly less restrictive of associational freedoms.”192
As noted above,193 Congress found that the military’s recruitment efforts
would be impeded without equal access to students in law schools’
employment fairs, in a location (often the campus itself) convenient to all
students. Thus, “even if enforcement of the [Solomon Amendment]
causes some incidental abridgement of . . . protected speech, that effect is
no greater than necessary to accomplish the [government’s] legitimate
purposes,”194 rendering it constitutional.
188
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The Third Circuit majority declined to apply these authorities
because the government had not “produce[d] any evidence that [the
Solomon Amendment] is no more than necessary to further the
government’s interest.”195 But there is no requirement in these
circumstances that the government need disprove that other solutions
would meet the government’s need with lesser effect on First
Amendment rights and with equal effectiveness. Otherwise “the
undoubted ability of lawyers and judges,” who are not budgetarily
constrained as Congress is, “to imagine some kind of less drastic or
restrictive an approach would make it impossible to write laws that deal
with the harm that called the statute into being.”196
Contrary to the Third Circuit majority position, there have been
many cases in which the Supreme Court has upheld legislation or
regulations without requiring a factual presentation beyond legislative
history. For example, in United States v. O’Brien,197 the Court sustained
legislation against draft card burning, on the basis of Congress’s say-so
that it was destructive of the Selective Service system, without extrinsic
evidence. In Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence,198 the Court
upheld a regulation against overnight camping based on the Park
Service’s judgment that it would protect parks against damage, without
any evidentiary showing that overnight camping would damage the park.
Indeed, the Court found that the regulation’s “narrow[] focus[] on the
Government’s substantial interest” was “apparent” from the face of the
regulation.199 It continued, to hold otherwise would require delegating
“the judiciary the authority to replace the Park Service as the manager of
the Nation’s parks or endow the judiciary with the competence to judge
how much protection of park lands is wise . . .”—a power the Court
rejected.200 And in United States v. Albertini201—particularly relevant
because it involved legislation furthering military security—the Court
accepted Congress’s judgment on the need to give military base
impact on the [school’s] operation,” but such limitation on religious liberty is justified
“‘by showing that it is essential to accomplish an overriding governmental interest.’” Id.
(quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257-58 (1982)).
195
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commanding officers the right to bar entry to a base, again without any
extrinsic evidence. Rather, it rejected the idea—espoused by the Third
Circuit in FAIR—that “regulations [are] invalid simply because there is
some imaginable alternative that might be less burdensome on
speech.”202
The Third Circuit majority ignored these instructions against
judicial second-guessing of legislative decisions by proposing alternate
solutions for military recruiting needs, such as “loan repayment programs
[or] television and radio advertisements.”203 But, as the above authorities
declare, courts are not supposed to substitute their views as to what
legislation should be for Congress’s actual decision, particularly as the
Third Circuit admitted that its substitute proposal “may be more
costly.”204 Further, the Third Circuit ignored the doubtlessly correct logic
that a military recruitment program focused on a limited target audience
of students already interested, at a known time and location, is more
effective than an unfocused general public one. Thus, logic, not some
unidentified evidence, is all that is needed to conclude that any
alternative to on-campus recruiting would not likely be as successful: if
on-campus recruiting were not the best way, law schools would not
schedule employment fairs, and employers would not come on-campus
for that purpose.
It is thus apparent that the Solomon Amendment is not
unconstitutional but a proper exercise of Congress’s spending powers.
V. INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY, NOT STRICT SCRUTINY,
IS THE PROPER STANDARD TO CONSIDER THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE SOLOMON AMENDMENT
Because the Solomon Amendment does not violate the law schools’
First Amendment rights, and, to the extent of any violation, it is de
minimus in comparison to the important government purpose furthered
by it, the Solomon Amendment is constitutional under any standard of
scrutiny applied to it.
In fact, the Third Circuit was in error in applying strict scrutiny,205
thereby disagreeing with the district court’s choice of intermediate
scrutiny,206 pursuant to United States v. O’Brien.207 The Third Circuit
held that O’Brien applied only when an activity does not involve “speech
202
203
204
205
206
207
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proper and is not protected under other First Amendment grounds,”208
referring to expressive conduct. As shown above, the Solomon
Amendment does not restrict law schools’ free speech. And, as no one
could conclude that a law school endorses any particular employer
merely because it is permitted to participate in an employment fair, no
association rights of the law schools are implicated.
But, even if it were concluded that free speech rights were infringed
by the Solomon Amendment, it would not preclude application of
intermediate scrutiny. Contrary to the Third Circuit’s holding, O’Brien is
applicable to situations in which legislation infringes free speech.
Indeed, O’Brien itself was an attack on the constitutionality of the
anti-draft card burning statute on the ground that it violated the plaintiff’s
free speech rights. There was no dispute that O’Brien burned his draft
card to express his opinion against the Vietnam War—i.e., an exercise of
free speech. Yet, O’Brien applied the intermediate scrutiny standard and
upheld the statute’s constitutionality.209
The attack on the Solomon Amendment is analogous to the attack
on the law prohibiting draft card burning in O’Brien. Both the anti-draft
card burning law and the Solomon Amendment have many “purposes
[that] would be defeated”210 by their violation without consideration of
the speech that may be incidentally restricted (whether protesting the
Vietnam War or “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell”). Also, in both cases Congress
had a “legitimate and substantial interest in preventing” violation of these
two laws.211 In O’Brien, the Court held that “when ‘speech’ and
‘nonspeech’ elements are combined in the same course of conduct, a
sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech
element can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment
freedoms,”212 if “the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression
of free expression.”213
If the undisputed impact on draft card burners’ free speech rights in
O’Brien was subject to intermediate, not strict, scrutiny, clearly any
questionable impact on law schools’ free speech rights in FAIR must also
call for intermediate scrutiny.
Other Supreme Court decisions similarly did not apply strict
scrutiny even though the statute in question was conceded to infringe on
free speech. For example, the Court in United States v. Albertini, relied
208
209
210
211
212
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on O’Brien to uphold the constitutionality of a statute despite
recognizing the “burden on speech” that occurred.214
The Court in O’Brien allowed the obvious functions served by the
Selective Service cards to be sufficient evidence of its legitimate
purpose.215 Thus, it is inappropriate for the Third Circuit to have
demanded extra evidence beyond the obvious purpose of improving
military recruiting that Congress has determined to be served by the
Solomon Amendment.
The Supreme Court has further held that:
courts must accord substantial deference to the predictive
judgments of Congress . . . Sound policymaking often requires
legislators to forecast future events and to anticipate the likely
impact of these events based on deductions and inferences for
which complete empirical support may be unavailable. As an
institution, moreover, Congress is far better equipped than the
judiciary to “amass and evaluate the vast amounts of data”. . . .216

The Third Circuit ignored this precedent by demanding that Congress
provide more evidence than is present in the legislative history and by
discounting Congress’s determination that the Solomon Amendment is
an effective way of fulfilling Congress’s goals. The Third Circuit
usurped the Congressional role and performed evaluations about which
the Supreme Court has held the judiciary to be inadequately equipped to
make.
The Third Circuit, while selecting the strict scrutiny standard, also
held that its ruling would not be different under intermediate scrutiny. In
purporting to apply intermediate scrutiny, the Third Circuit did not
dispute that the Solomon Amendment fulfills three of the four asserted
criteria for constitutionality. That court’s dispute was limited to whether
the Solomon Amendment infringes on First Amendment rights more than
is essential.217 This purported application of intermediate scrutiny is
essentially strict scrutiny disguised, because the court applied the strict
scrutiny standard that, since a less restrictive measure can be imagined,
the regulation must be unconstitutional.
Intermediate scrutiny does not require the statute be the leastrestrictive means of accomplishing the government’s goals.218 Rather, a
statute satisfies the narrowly tailored requirement and the “incidental
214
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burden on speech is no greater than is essential . . . so long as the neutral
regulation promotes a substantial government interest that would be
achieved less effectively absent the regulation.”219 Other Circuits have
applied this application of intermediate scrutiny. For example, in Casey
v. City of Newport, Rhode Island,220 the First Circuit described a
regulation as valid that “promoted a substantial government interest . . .
that would have been achieved less effectively absent the regulation, and
. . . did so without burdening substantially more speech than
necessary.”221 Therefore, if the scrutiny standard would affect the
determination, intermediate scrutiny should have been applied.
V. CONCLUSION
The Solomon Amendment does not infringe academic freedom nor
violate the Spending Clause. Rather, the Solomon Amendment serves the
important purpose of establishing and maintaining a capable military, a
duty of Congress under Article I. Also, it enhances academic freedom of
students by conditioning the grant of federal funds on permitting students
the right to choose to hear the military recruiter’s message. The Third
Circuit decision depends on an erroneous finding that the Solomon
Amendment violates the First Amendment, which it does not, and, if at
all, certainly not to the extent that it overcomes Congress’s valid purpose
in enacting it.
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